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Introduction to Fairness in Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, 2013) 
 
Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams* 
 
The relationship between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually 
cast as an adversarial one.1 Rational choice economics describes human behavior as 
motivated by simple self-interest, rather than by concerns of morality, justice, or fairness. 
Thus, it may seem strange to devote a volume to fairness within the field of law and 
economics. Yet we have found that the connections between concepts of fairness and the 
economic analysis of law are robust and diverse. We have compiled a volume of 
scholarship in which economics engages with fairness, challenging the idea that the two 
concepts are alien to each other. Indeed, the literature is so large that we could easily 
have produced a volume several times the size of this one.  
We begin this introduction with some observations on the importance—indeed, 
inescapability—of fairness concerns in law and economics. We then discuss the 
organization and content of this volume. 
 
THE INEVITABILITY OF FAIRNESS CONCERNS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
Whatever one may think of fairness as an independent normative criterion, a law and 
economics researcher cannot avoid confronting fairness concerns. As a positive matter, 
there is the brute fact of fairness preferences. A wealth of experimental data corroborates 
the everyday observation that people care about, and respond to, fair and unfair treatment.  
Individuals exhibit both an aversion to arbitrary inequality and a preference for inequality 
based on desert. Predictions about human behavior will go badly astray if they fail to 
recognize when individuals will, at a cost to themselves, choose to distribute wealth to 
others, reward those who contribute to public goods, or punish those who free-ride. The 
most parsimonious theory for many disparate experimental and real world observations 
across many cultures is that people get utility from reciprocating kindness with kindness 
and unkindness with unkindness. Quite simply, people gain and lose when they observe 
or help to create fair and unfair states of affairs. As the literature we review shows, 
fairness preferences affect fundamentals such as market prices, bargaining, and 
compliance with law. One ignores them at great explanatory cost. 
Fairness turns up in normative theory as well, appearing both as an input into, and a 
rival criterion to, welfare economics. Welfare theory can incorporate a preference for 
fairness in two ways. First, the satisfaction of fairness preferences generates welfare just 
as the satisfaction of any preference generates welfare. Second, fairness is often 
concerned with distribution, and a social welfare function (SWF) can be structured to 
value certain distributions. A utilitarian SWF seeks to maximize the sum of individual 
                                                 
* The authors thank Matthew Adler, Francesco Parisi, Chris Sanchirico, and David Weisbach for helpful 
comments, and Jeffrey Levine and Lea Madry for research assistance. Fennell also thanks the Stuart C. and 
JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.    
1 This view is encapsulated in works like ARTHUR OKUN, EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1975). 
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utilities, but welfare theory is also consistent with the selection of a SWF that would put 
some independent weight on achieving equality of welfare across individuals.2  
In another sense, however, fairness and welfare really are rivals.  Kaplow and Shavell 
(K&S) have famously argued that fairness (which they take to include any non-welfare 
value, such as morality, justice, or dignity) has no value apart from its effect on welfare.3 
Moreover, to the extent that distribution of resources affects welfare, K&S contend that 
the law should pursue its distributive objectives entirely through taxes and transfers.4 
Together, these two theses suggest there is no reason for non-tax law to concern itself 
with fairness because (a) the correct goal is welfare and (b) to the extent that the fairness 
of material distribution affects welfare, the only correct policy response is an adjustment 
in taxes. Economists have criticized both K&S theses, and we reproduce some of those 
debates here.5  Our review of the literature has inspired some additional thoughts about 
the normative relevance of fairness to the economic analysis of law. We will mention 
four. 
First, law and economics scholarship tends to artificially separate questions of 
efficiency (“the size of the pie”) from questions of fairness or distribution (“who gets 
which slices”).6 But maximizing and slicing are not separate operations if our ultimate 
concern is welfare rather than wealth.  One can separately create and redistribute wealth, 
but one cannot “take” someone’s welfare and dole it out to others. Some of the ways in 
                                                 
2 For example, a SWF might incorporate a Rawlsian theory of distributive justice that allows inequality 
only when necessary to improve the lot of the least well off. More weakly, Matthew Adler’s continuous 
prioritarianism gives additional weight to the welfare of the least well off, but does not rule out all increases 
in inequality that fail to leave them better off. See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR 
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 356-378 (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 
2011).  
3 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle 
(this volume) and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment 
Violates the Pareto Principle (this volume); see also LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS 
VERSUS WELFARE (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
4 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income (this volume) and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the 
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income (this volume).  
5 We stress that our coverage is far from comprehensive. We have included work by only a fraction of the 
scholars who have made valuable contributions to these debates, and we have also had to truncate some 
debates that continued beyond the articles reproduced here.   
6 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (New York NY: 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 4th ed. 2011) (“efficiency corresponds to ‘the size of the pie,’ while 
equity has to do with how it is sliced”).  This division of labor is evident in the approaches that welfarists 
like K&S employ, and can also be observed in the two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. See, 
e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 326-27 
(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 1995) (stating the First Theorem, in which a competitive 
equilibrium yields a Pareto optimal allocation, and the Second Theorem, in which transfers of a numeraire 
commodity can produce, through a competitive equilibrium, any given Pareto optimal set of utilities); 
Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 817 n.21 (2005) (referencing 
“the argument of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, tracking the two welfare theorems, that the general 
legal system should be evaluated vis-à-vis the goal of welfare maximization or allocative efficiency, 
leaving the tax system to redistribute wealth.”);  Michael J. Meurer, Fair Division (book review), 47 
BUFFALO L. REV. 937, 941 n. 28 (1999) (“Law and economics scholars rely on the Second Theorem to 
justify legal analysis that bifurcates efficiency and fairness analysis of the law. The usual attitude is that 
law should be shaped by efficiency concerns, and the legislature can achieve fairness through taxing and 
spending policies.”).  
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which society advances welfare involve the in-kind distribution of entitlements like civil 
rights and civil liberties that cannot later be distilled into transfer payments if they are 
initially allocated unfairly.7  Further, the perceived fairness of societal rules and 
institutions can increase or decrease welfare in ways that cannot be replicated through the 
redistribution of money.  For example, if governmental exercises of eminent domain are 
viewed as unfairly taking property away from private parties, even direct compensation 
to those parties will not necessarily address the disutility that they (and onlookers) feel; 
tax credits that merely elevate the financial position of people in the condemnee’s income 
bracket would be even less responsive to the utility loss.  Because fairness preferences 
influence welfare directly and nontransferably, we cannot divide the tasks of creating 
welfare and distributing it.  
Second, even if wealth maximization is accepted as a useful way station on the path 
to achieving society’s preferred social welfare function, fair distribution—and fair 
processes of distribution—may be a necessary step toward maximizing wealth.  Fairness 
perceptions and the consequences of perceived unfairness can profoundly influence all of 
the activities and choices that would otherwise make the pie grow, from cooperating, to 
bargaining, to settling disputes, to complying with the law. For example, we should 
expect more crime, and particularly more theft, if there is unequal distribution of wealth, 
so a “fair” distribution might be necessary to reduce crime and thereby maximize wealth.  
If we want to motivate the population to obey law and contribute to public goods, as a 
means of maximizing wealth, it may be necessary that they perceive the legal system as 
being fair in ways that depend on the substantive content of legal rules and not only the 
structure of tax law.8  If we wait until pie-slicing time to make things fair, we might find 
ourselves slicing a smaller pie.   
Third, fairness considerations bear on which social welfare function to use. In their 
examples, K&S often use a utilitarian SWF, but they insist that their defense of welfare is 
consistent with other SWFs, including those that put value on the equal distribution of 
welfare (as by maximizing the product of individual utilities rather than maximizing their 
sum). As a purely definitional matter, K&S would not view the choice of an SWF as 
implicating fairness, because they define the term “fairness” to refer exclusively to 
nonwelfarist concerns. Yet because the choice of a particular SWF necessarily involves a 
decision about how to weigh the distribution of welfare (the decision to ignore 
distribution being a distributive choice), the welfarist endeavor cannot be entirely 
separated from what many view as core questions of fairness.  
Indeed, as Daniel Farber explains, there is nothing in K&S’s account that would 
counsel against a person or society reasoning backwards from a fairness intuition to 
decide which SWF to pick.9 A theorist who believes people should not be free to sell 
themselves into slavery can, without violating any principle of welfare theory, ask which 
SWFs are maximized by allowing such an institution and reject them for that reason. 
Instead of welfarism absorbing preferences for fairness, preferences for fairness dictate 
                                                 
7 For a related discussion, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary versus In-Kind 
Remedies, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 151.  
8 For example, people are more likely to comply with criminal law if they perceive their local police to be 
procedurally fair. See, in this volume, Tom Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law. 
9 Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1802-3 
(2003). 
4 
 
which form of welfarism we choose. The very act of constructing a social welfare 
function requires answering a host of questions that require a fairness theory, beginning 
with the question of whose welfare should count. The intuitions that tell us to include 
infants and people with disabilities, and to exclude some animals and all plants are not 
welfare theories, but instead fall within the category of moral theories that K&S associate 
with fairness. In the end, one aggregates the welfare it is fair to aggregate. 
Finally, and most interestingly, the welfarist’s ideal point can be reached by more 
than one potential path, and there are fairness-based reasons to suspect that the K&S-
endorsed combination of efficient legal rules and tax and transfer will not always be the 
cheapest route.  The reason relates to the political costs of redistribution, and it requires a 
bit of groundwork to set up.   
Suppose that we adopt a SWF that calls for maximizing the sum of individual welfare 
levels.10  We cannot maximize welfare without paying attention to the distribution of 
wealth, unless one believes (improbably) that maximizing wealth will also automatically 
maximize welfare.11  Maximizing welfare thus requires achieving certain distributive 
objectives. On K&S’s account, those objectives should be pursued exclusively through 
tax and transfer mechanisms. Their reason for preferring such mechanisms over legal 
rules that aim in the direction of the welfare-maximizing distribution is based on the 
behavioral distortions that each approach might be expected to generate. If we (for 
example) grant larger recoveries to impecunious tort victims than to wealthy ones, or 
charge rich injurers more than we charge their less well-off counterparts, the argument 
runs, we will distort not only their labor-leisure choices but will also introduce a 
distortion in their tort-related conduct.12  The latter distortion occurs because the tort rule 
selected for distributional reasons will deviate from the tort rule that is optimal for 
maximizing wealth. Assuming the labor-leisure distortion is equivalent for both methods 
of redistribution,13 we should favor the method that does not entail an additional 
distortion. 
                                                 
10 Our analysis would be the same if some other SWF were selected, as long it was sensitive in some way to 
the distribution of wealth. We choose the utilitarian criterion here for simplicity and concreteness.  
11 The intuitive reason why maximizing wealth will be unlikely to maximize welfare relates to the 
diminishing marginal utility of money. The marginal dollar held by the well off is likely to do a very poor 
job at producing increases in welfare, compared with the marginal dollar held by the less well off. Put 
another way, wealth maximization focuses on maximizing value as measured by willingness to pay. But 
given unequal wealth distributions, willingness to pay is a poor metric for the utility that will be derived 
from a given resource. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-16 (New York, NY: 
Aspen Publishers, 8th ed. 2011) (presenting an example in which a poor family has a much greater 
objective need for pituitary extract than does a rich family, and observing that “[i]n the sense of value used 
in this book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich family than to the poor one, because value is 
measured by willingness to pay”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CALIF. L. 
REV. 815, 840 (1990) (discussing how wealth differentials can introduce discrepancies between who is 
willing to pay the most for something and who will derive the most utility from it).  
12 See this volume: Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the 
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income. 
13 Redistribution creates a distortion in the work/leisure trade-off because the individual receives 100% of 
the value of his or her leisure, but less than 100% of the value of his or her work. This distortion occurs 
whether one is redistributing through taxes or the substantive content of legal rules (other than tax). But see 
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, this volume (questioning 
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Yet efforts to achieve distributive objectives carry political costs in addition to those 
K&S discuss.14 Any proposed distributive change, whether accomplished through legal 
rules or through tax policy, elicits a certain amount of political resistance. This resistance 
may impede movement to a preferred distributive position, or cause great welfare losses 
in the process of achieving such movement.  Fairness preferences may themselves raise 
these political costs because people have different conceptions of fairness and are willing 
to incur costs to bring them about. Thus, the wealthy may lobby to reduce tax burdens 
below the optimal level, while the middle and lower income groups may push for a 
higher than optimal level of progressivity.15 Crucially, the size of political costs may vary 
by the method of redistribution. Achieving a unit of redistribution through substantive 
legal rules may not carry the same political costs as achieving that redistribution unit 
through taxes and transfers. If people are more willing to incur political costs when they 
perceive distributive changes as unfair (or indeed, when they perceive them as changes), 
then the manner in which distributive goals are pursued matters.     
Put differently, the choice is not between one labor-leisure distortion through tax 
rules or that same distortion to labor-leisure plus a second distortion in other behavior 
through non-tax rules. Instead, if we are listing the costs of the two methods of 
redistribution (tax vs. doctrine), we have (by assumption) an invariant cost on both sides 
of the ledger (the labor-leisure distortion), an additional cost on the doctrinal side of the 
ledger (the behavioral distortion), plus the political costs of redistribution, which also fall 
on both sides of the ledger. But there is no reason to expect that the magnitude of the 
political costs will be invariant to the means of redistribution. Because the political costs 
of tax redistribution could be much higher than the political costs of doctrinal 
distribution—enough higher to outweigh the behavioral distortion uniquely associated 
with legal rules—it is an empirical question which is the cheapest method.  
It should not be surprising or controversial that moving resources among people costs 
something, and that these costs should matter to an economic analysis; indeed, this is the 
core message of the Coase Theorem.16 If transaction costs were actually zero, one would 
achieve efficiency regardless of the legal rules because the parties would always bargain 
to the efficient outcome. But while legal doctrine would not affect efficiency, it would 
still affect distribution, because the legal rule determines who (if anyone) has to pay 
whom to move the entitlement to the highest valued user. Thus, with zero transaction 
costs, the only remaining reason to pick one substantive legal doctrine over another 
would be distributional (fairness) considerations.17 Of course, transaction costs are not 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether the labor/leisure distortion is as large when redistribution is accomplished through legal rules as it 
is when accomplished through tax and transfer, given cognitive biases).  
14 We are not the first to note the potential implications of political costs for the K&S thesis. See, e.g., 
Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Articles Are Wrong, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 511, 557, 597-601 (2005).  
15 The influence of self-interest on perceptions of fairness is explored in Linda Babcock, George 
Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, and Colin Camerer's article in this volume, Biased Judgments of 
Fairness in Bargaining. Thus, even citizens who strive to pursue fairness in distributive results may tend to 
pursue results that favor their own interests. For one take on how class coalitions might play out in the 
political arena, see George J. Stigler, Director’s Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J. L. & ECON 1 
(1970).   
16 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  
17 Stewart Schwab has dubbed this point "the distributive corollary of the Coase Theorem." Stewart 
Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1195 
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zero, but once we start to consider the costs of moving resources among people to 
achieve welfarist objectives, we must count all the costs, including political ones. 
Because our goal is to find the least costly way to achieve the welfare-maximizing 
distribution—whether through tax rules, substantive legal rules, or a combination of the 
two—we must take into account the political costs that the K&S thesis ignores.18 
Some examples will help to clarify our point. One basic decision is whether a 
resource will be distributed through markets or through non-market criteria.  Suppose 
there are some goods—kidneys for transplant, subsistence-level food, freedom from 
military service or jury duty—for  which many people do not think that willingness to 
pay represents a normatively fair metric. If legal institutions follow fairness intuitions in 
allocating that resource instead of auctioning it to the highest bidder, what is lost and 
what is gained?  Following K&S, it might seem we lose efficiency by distorting decisions 
in the relevant market, and we gain nothing because whatever distributive changes are 
generated by our allocation mechanism can be more cheaply produced through tax and 
transfer.  Both parts of this equation require scrutiny. 
Recall that our ultimate objective is (by assumption) not wealth maximization but 
welfare maximization. Some notions of fairness implicitly or explicitly incorporate the 
observation that resources may generate more well-being in the hands of those who 
cannot bid the largest number of dollars for them.19 If these fairness intuitions do a 
relatively good job on average of tracking the real variable of interest—utility or 
welfare— they may offer a better guide to efficiency (defined by reference to such a 
maximand) than does willingness-to-pay, at least in some contexts. For example, where 
wealth differentials are great, a rule that allocates a particular good – for example, a 
minimal allocation of food or a kidney transplant – based on expert assessment of need 
might do better than an auction if other indicia of the good's utility to the potential 
recipients – like post-transplant longevity – are available.20 In some cases, such as the 
allocation of certain governmental benefits or services, the willingness to incur the costs 
of a queue might be a better proxy for welfare than a willingness to pay.21    
                                                                                                                                                 
(1989) ("With zero transaction costs, initial entitlements cannot be justified on efficiency grounds, and so 
should be awarded on the basis of need or desert."); see also Meurer, supra note 6, at 943 (“[W]hen 
Coasean conditions of low transaction costs prevail, then property rights should be allocated according to 
fairness criteria[.]”); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The 
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 NYU L. REV. 440, 448 (1995) ("In short, when transaction costs are 
insignificant, efficiency concerns become irrelevant to the judge's inquiry; only justice reasons matter.").    
18 K&S do recognize that there may be political impediments to optimal redistributive taxation, but do not 
address the point’s implications for their thesis in depth. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal 
System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, this volume, at 675 (“An argument 
sometimes offered in favor of redistribution through legal rules is that the tax system falls short of optimal 
redistributive taxation—perhaps because of the balance of political power in the legislature. This argument 
raises questions that we do not seek to address about the function of courts in a democracy.”); see also 
Markovits, supra note 144, at 597-601 (discussing K&S’s treatment of political barriers).  
19 Sen's capability approach, discussed in his contribution to this collection, provides one example. See 
Amartya Sen, On the Foundations of Welfare Economics: Utility, Capability, and Practical Reason, this 
volume. 
20 We focus here only on the method of allocating of kidneys to end users. Using a need-based allocation 
criterion would be fully consistent with the use of market mechanisms to purchase kidneys from sellers.   
21 For a related discussion, see generally Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law (working paper, 
2012) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147333.  
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Not only might using such fairness criteria to select legal rules offer a more direct 
route to society’s welfare maximizing point, we might expect the correspondence of these 
criteria to fairness intuitions to ease the political path.  Moving a certain number of 
dollars from one income class to another might generate less political resistance when 
done by a substantive (non-tax) legal rule that is popularly perceived as fair than by a tax-
and-transfer system that is widely viewed as unfair. The public might perceive in the 
latter case but not the former that we are taking away money from people who have 
“earned it,” and giving it to others who have not.22 If common attitudes about 
deservingness or desert apply differently for substantive legal rules than for the tax 
system, then the political costs of redistribution through these mechanisms will be 
asymmetric as well. Notably, the affront to fairness associated with the shift, and the 
political costs it generates, exist independent of the effects on the labor/leisure choice.  
Even if we assume that allocating certain goods outside of the market structure distorts 
the labor/leisure choice just as much, due to its effects on the value that one can derive 
from one’s earnings, the political opposition may be substantially less.  Significantly, this 
point holds whether one believes that political opposition is more likely to hamper moves 
toward greater progressivity, or moves in the opposite direction.      
To take another example, consider siting decisions for locally undesirable land uses.  
It may be inevitable that less wealthy people will end up next to these sites in the long 
run, whether because their communities are targeted initially, or because they move near 
the areas following the depreciation of the surrounding land and the evacuation of 
wealthier landowners.23  But this very inevitability suggests a bargaining opportunity that 
could vindicate distributive objectives.  Entitlements could be granted in a way that 
would require the well-off to make payments to the less well-off in order to produce or 
maintain this spatial pattern.24 This combination of initial allocation and later bargaining 
might be cheaper—to the extent it better accords with notions of fairness—than a 
similarly-sized transfer payment to the less well-off.25  Thus, a focus on political costs 
suggests that fairness comes into the analysis not only in defining the distributive goal, 
but also in determining how it may be most cost-effectively pursued.   
 
THE VOLUME 
 
                                                 
22 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 35 (New York 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2002) (“If people intuitively feel that they are in an absolute sense morally 
entitled to their net incomes, it is not surprising that politicians can get away with describing tax increases 
(which diminish net income) as taking from the people what belongs to them.”).  
23 See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally 
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1018-24 (1993) (discussing and critiquing the 
“mobility objection” to fair siting policies, which “asks whether siting decisions will have any enduring 
distributional effect, given the dynamics of the housing and land markets”).  
24.The discussion in the text assumes that some households will be located near the locally undesirable land 
use, so that the question is one of distributing the costs associated with the siting. It is of course possible 
that the appropriate policy response would involve separating the land use from residential areas altogether. 
25 That the route to a result may matter is consistent with the work of Bruno Frey and his coauthors in their 
piece in this volume, Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters. See also 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 357-
60 (2006) (arguing that the goodness or badness of a particular gain or loss depends not only on its size but 
also on the process by which it came about).  
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Our goal in this volume is to offer readers entry points into the body of scholarship 
exploring the connections between fairness and the economic analysis of law. In the 
course of constructing the collection, we discovered that these connections are expansive 
and diverse.  Distilling the literature into a useful volume of reasonable length required us 
to make a number of difficult decisions about inclusion and exclusion, which we explain 
here.  
The volume is divided into three parts.  Part I engages in positive analysis.  The 
articles in this section investigate fairness perceptions and preferences from empirical and 
theoretical perspectives, and examine the impact of these perceptions and preferences on 
legal outcomes and the effectiveness of legal rules.  Part II turns to normative analysis 
and to the broad question of how law should reconcile fairness and efficiency 
considerations.  Much of this part is organized around two debates sparked by Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, one on whether fairness should play any independent role in 
normative analysis, and another on whether legal rules should be used to realize 
distributive goals.  Part III presents a series of applications.  The pieces in this section 
take up fairness in law and economics within a variety of policy areas and doctrinal 
contexts.   
 
We begin the positive analysis with articles discussing fairness preferences and, to a 
lesser extent, fairness beliefs, each of which constitutes a fundamental means by which 
fairness matters for economic models. A good starting point for the volume is Matthew 
Rabin’s pioneering article Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. 
Rabin posits that individuals react emotionally to the perceived intentions of others, i.e., 
the intent to help or hurt, and that those emotions change the utility payoffs of different 
actions, creating new “fairness” equilibria in many games. The preference for fairness 
can therefore change behavior, but even when behavior is unchanged, the preferences can 
have welfare effects (of the sort mostly discussed in Part II). Rabin describes the 
experimental data supporting fairness preferences in 1993, but there has been a lot of 
work since that time, as subsequent articles show. A good example is In Search of Homo 
Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, in which Joseph 
Henrich and co-authors show that the experimental support for fairness preferences are, 
to some degree, transcultural. They ran ultimatum, public goods, and dictator game 
experiments on non-student populations in diverse non-industrialized societies and their 
results show that preferences other than conventional self-interest are at play, though 
there are interesting differences between cultures they seek to explain. Another recent 
example is Pamela Jakiela’s Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal 
Institutions: Experimental Evidence, which shows how behavior in Dictator Games is 
affected by whether the money being divided was obtained by luck or earned by effort. 
She finds evidence that people have fairness preferences based on “deservingness,” but 
that these preferences vary across cultures. 
Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher seek to explain the more recent wealth of 
experimental data from these and other games in their article A Theory of Reciprocity, 
The authors present a formal model of reciprocity, extending Rabin’s article to account 
for behavioral responses to the interpersonal comparison of outcomes, as well as to the 
evaluation of intentions. Reciprocity is, of course, well within the ambit of fairness, as 
reciprocating “kindness” and “unkindness” (broadly understood in these articles) is part 
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of what individuals commonly characterize as fair behavior. Falk & Fischbacher also 
explain how individuals trade off their preference for reciprocity for other goods, so that 
in competitive markets, even those who value reciprocity can agree to very unfair 
contracts. In a later article, Testing Theories of Fairness—Intentions Matter, Falk, Ernst 
Fehr, and Fischbacher identify the difficulties of proving from then-existing data whether 
people’s behavior responds to their perception of the intentions of others. They design 
and present an experiment to overcome these difficulties, finding that behavior is 
explained by neither material distribution nor intentions alone, but by models considering 
both distribution and intentions.  
Much of the fairness literature emphasizes the reciprocation of kindness, but there is a 
subliterature that focuses on preferences for punishing negative behavior. People are 
willing to pay to punish individuals who have transgressed in experimental games, such 
as free-riders who fail to contribute in a public goods game, even though the 
experimental design rules out any strategic incentive for punishment. Jeffrey P. Carpenter 
summarizes this literature and extends it in The Demand for Punishment. He presents 
experimental results showing that punishment behavior follows the law of demand, in 
that people punish less as the price of punishment rises.  
Following this overview of fairness preferences, we turn briefly to fairness beliefs. In 
Fairness and Redistribution, Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos offer a 
positive political model of tax and welfare policies. Their model shows that there can be 
multiple equilibria where such policies are supported by different equilibrium fairness 
beliefs about the connection between work effort and wealth. For example, there can be a 
European-style equilibrium with high levels of tax progressivity and social insurance, 
weaker work effort, and fairness beliefs that emphasize the connection between luck and 
wealth. Yet there can also be an American-style equilibrium with low progressivity and 
insurance, high work effort, and fairness beliefs that emphasize the connection between 
effort and wealth. 
Next, we turn to the legal and economic consequences of fairness perceptions and 
preferences.  Three articles explore the impact of fairness considerations and beliefs on 
prices, bargaining, and settlement.  Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard 
Thaler's canonical piece Fairness as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the 
Market uses an experimental design to study how the perceived unfairness of actions like 
sharply raising the price of snow shovels during a snow storm might cause firm behavior 
to diverge from economic predictions.  Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel 
Issacharoff, and Colin Camerer's article Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining 
experimentally examines how systematically self-serving perceptions of fairness 
influence predictions of judicial outcomes and contribute to bargaining impasse.  In 
Pretrial Settlement with Fairness, Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino theoretically model the 
impact of fairness perceptions and tastes on pre-trial bargaining dynamics.   
The next set of articles explores the implications of fairness perceptions for law 
enforcement and legal compliance.  Tom R. Tyler's pathbreaking work Procedural 
Fairness and Compliance with the Law underscores the importance of processes that are 
believed to be fair in producing the legitimacy that supports widespread voluntary 
compliance with the law. In Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also 
How Matters, Bruno S. Frey, Matthias Benz, and Alois Stutzer try to incorporate into 
economics the idea that individuals care not only about outcomes, but also the procedures 
10 
 
that produce outcomes. They explore how procedural utility affects behavior, including 
compliance with law. One promising area of application for these ideas is tax 
compliance. We include a recent selection from the growing literature on this topic: 
Marius van Dijke and Peter Verboon, Trust in Authorities as a Boundary Condition to 
Procedural Fairness Effects on Tax Compliance. Finally, Richard McAdams examines 
additional facets of the question of legal compliance in Economic Costs of Inequality, 
including the possibility that material inequality increases street crime and political 
corruption, as it increases their productivity relative to legal options for generating 
income.  
 
Part II turns to normative analysis, beginning with some pieces that, in various ways, 
frame the relationship between efficiency and fairness.  In On the Foundations of Welfare 
Economics: Utility, Capability, and Practical Reason, Amartya Sen shows how a 
capabilities approach offers an alternative to utilitarianism as a foundation for welfare 
economics—one that can do a better job of avoiding unfair results.   Kenneth Arrow's 
The Trade-off between Growth and Equity analyzes the impacts of redistribution in the 
direction of equity on efficiency in the allocation of resources over time, recognizing both 
potential negative impacts on incentives and savings and potential positive impacts on 
human capital development.  In How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?, 
Elizabeth Anderson considers how the information-aggregation advantages of markets 
emphasized by Hayek can be pursued without allowing market luck to have a 
normatively unacceptable effect on life outcomes. 
The next two sections cover two famous debates inspired by the provocative work of 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. Part II.B surveys the argument over Fairness versus 
Welfare, the title Kaplow and Shavell give to their book on the subject. We begin with 
two of their articles: The Conflict between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle 
and Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle. 
Kaplow and Shavell argue for channeling all normative evaluations of policy through the 
method of welfare economics, which involves maximizing welfare according to a social 
welfare function (SWF). In making this point, they are agnostic as to which social welfare 
function we should use, but emphasize that a plausible SWF can incorporate values such 
as equality (as by seeking to maximize the product of all individual utilities rather than 
their sum). Kaplow and Shavell also emphasize that fairness preferences enter into the 
social welfare calculus in just the same way that any other preference does, so the 
achievement of fair policy has an instrumental value in maximizing welfare. But their 
most provocative claim is that this instrumental value exhausts all the concern that one 
should have for fairness (by which they mean all values other than welfare, e.g., morality, 
dignity, autonomy). Kaplow and Shavell demonstrate that if one gives fairness any 
independent weight then it is inevitable that there will be situations where the fairness 
requirement violates the Pareto Principle by making everyone worse off. They also seek 
to undermine the intuitive appeal to claims of fairness by explaining those intuitions as 
the mere byproduct of (generally functional but crude) moral principles that individuals 
internalize as children.  
The final point of the Kaplow/Shavell thesis – total rejection of any non-welfare 
method of policy assessment – has generated a substantial critical literature, from which 
we select some leading articles. We include three pieces from the Journal of Legal 
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Studies symposium on Kaplow and Shavell’s book: (1) Richard Craswell, Kaplow and 
Shavell on the Substance of Fairness; (2) Jeremy Waldron, Locating Distribution; and (3) 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being, and Morality in Social Decisions. An 
advantage of including these pieces is that we can include Kaplow & Shavell’s direct 
response: Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and 
Distributive Justice. We then turn to a later criticism by Gillian K. Hadfield, in her article 
Feminism, Fairness, and Welfare: An Invitation to Feminist Law and Economics. Part of 
this article also concerns the issues in the next section. 
Part II.C addresses another contentious and important topic: the best legal 
mechanisms for redistributing wealth. Again, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have 
defended a pivotal claim: that, when income redistribution is justified, the legal system 
should accomplish redistribution only through the system of taxes and transfers. We 
include their classic article Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income. The alternative that Kaplow and Shavell reject is to redistribute 
through substantive legal doctrines, such as rules of tort liability or damages that favor 
the poor. Again, there is a large literature critiquing this claim, from which we select two 
leading articles: Christine Jolls’s Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal 
Rules, and Chris William Sanchirico’s Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for 
Equity: A More Equitable View. We also include the Kaplow and Shavell response to the 
Sanchirico article, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal 
Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income. 26 
 
Part III presents a sampling of legal and policy applications in which both fairness 
and efficiency considerations prove important.  Three wide-ranging papers take on large 
questions of institutional and policy design.  In Dividing the Indivisible, H. Peyton Young 
examines methods for resolving disputes over goods that are difficult or costly to divide, 
using examples ranging from international territorial disputes to child custody battles.   
Matthew D. Adler's Risk Equity: A New Proposal examines the distributive implications 
of risk regulation and uses economic modeling to construct a new probability-based 
principle of risk equity.  In Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, David Weisbach and Cass R. Sunstein explain how debates over discount 
rates can be broken down into separate inquiries about intergenerational distributive 
justice and about the efficient use of resources.     
Two classic articles examining the relationship between efficiency and fairness start 
off our series of doctrinal applications.  Boris I. Bittker's piece, Equity, Efficiency, and 
Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities? points out the conflicting 
behavioral assumptions underpinning efficiency and equity theories of taxation, and 
shows how responses to features of a tax system may produce quite counterintuitive and 
unexpected distributive results.  In Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, Frank I. Michelman delves into the 
conditions that should trigger governmental compensation, using both a utilitarian 
calculus (incorporating efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and settlement costs) and a 
Rawlsian account of fairness.   
                                                 
26 See also Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
1003, 1034-41, 1048-51 (2001) (responding to arguments made in Kaplow and Shavell’s response). 
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 Four more recent pieces in other doctrinal areas round out the collection.  Ernst Fehr, 
Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder's article, Contracts as Reference Points—
Experimental Evidence, sheds empirical light on how initial contract terms serve as 
reference points that shape perceptions of fair conduct, with implications for the choice 
between rigid and flexible long-term contracts.  In An Attempt to Incorporate Fairness 
into an Economic Model of Tort Law, Henrik Lando models the impact of fairness 
preferences among would-be victims and injurers on the optimal standard of care.  A. 
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell examine how the perceived fairness of criminal 
sanctions influences the optimal combination of probability and severity of punishment in 
The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement.27 Turning to 
family law, Jon Elster's piece Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the 
Child uses a cost-conscious framework that draws on both utilitarianism and Rawlsian 
notions of fairness to challenge the "best interests of the child" standard in custody cases. 
 
Having described the volume’s contents, we will now comment on three especially 
noteworthy topical exclusions.  First, we did not engage the topic of discrimination based 
on protected group characteristics.  Such discrimination is an obvious and enormously 
important source of unfairness, and one with well-recognized connections to both law 
and economics.  To do this area of the literature justice, however, would have meant 
devoting a substantial part of this collection to a field that has received considerable 
independent attention and for which at least one excellent guide to the literature already 
exists.28 
Second, we devoted only a small portion of the volume to questions of tax policy, an 
area in which both economic analysis and fairness loom especially large.  Again, our 
decision was driven by the fact that this large and interesting field has been expertly 
reviewed in prior literature, including within a prior volume in this series.29   
Third, we did not directly engage questions of fairness and efficiency in public 
benefits policies, topics that are typically surveyed in public finance textbooks.30  
However, as already noted, we extensively cover a core debate on whether distributive 
results are better pursued through tax and transfer programs rather than through legal 
rules. 
We also excluded some material for format reasons. With rare exceptions, we opted 
for relatively brief contributions in order to expose readers to a broad spectrum of 
                                                 
27 While Polinsky and Shavell focus on the fairness-based utility and disutility that penalties generate, 
penalty levels (and other features of law that make them seem more or less fair) could influence 
compliance. See, e.g., Emanuela Carbonara, Francesco Parisi, & Georg von Wangenheim, Unjust Laws and 
Illegal Norms, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 285 (2012) (modeling connections between sanctions and norm-
based backlash); Peter Verboon & Marius van Dijke, When Do Severe Sanctions Enhance Compliance? 
The Role of Procedural Fairness, 32 J. ECON. PSYCH. 120 (2011) (examining how procedural fairness 
interacts with sanction severity to increase compliance).   
28 John J. Donohue, Antidiscrimination Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1387 (Oxford UK: 
Elsevier, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007); see also 2 ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW, Part II, (Northampton MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, John J. Donahue, ed. 2007); 
Symposium on the Law and Economics of Race, 41 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 321 (2012). 
29 THE ECONOMICS OF TAX LAW (Northampton MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, David A. Weisbach, ed., 
2008).  
30 See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE, Part III (New York NY: McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, 9th ed. 2010). 
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perspectives and topics.  We were also largely limited to journal contributions rather than 
sections of books.  There are a number of important books that deserve mention here, 
however, including Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-
Benefit Analysis (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), Jon Elster, Local 
Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (New York NY: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1992), Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus 
Welfare (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Hervé Moulin, Cooperative 
Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), and H. Peyton Young, Equity: In Theory and Practice (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
 
There is much more that could be said by way of introduction, but we do not want to 
stand any longer between our readers and the interesting materials that follow. We hope 
that the collection will spark new work in this field, and convince the skeptical that 
fairness holds an important place in the economic analysis of law. 
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